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 Political Connections and Minority-Shareholder Protection: 
Evidence from Securities-Market Regulation in China 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Recent studies of corporate ownership around the world have found that diffuse 
ownership is relatively uncommon and most corporations are controlled by large block holders.1 
Consequently, the primary concern of corporate governance has broadened from mitigating the 
agency conflicts between firm managers and diffuse shareholders (Berle and Means (1932); 
Jensen and Meckling (1976)) to protecting minority shareholders from expropriation by a 
controlling block holder and her management team (Shleifer and Vishny (1997)).2   
In discussing needed governance reforms, La Porta et al. (2000) suggest that countries 
change the “rules and enforcement mechanisms” for protecting investors “towards some 
successful standard,”—a process they refer to as “legal convergence.” 3  La Porta et al. (2002) 
support this guidance by demonstrating that firms in countries with better investor protection are 
more valuable than firms in countries with poorer investor protection.   
                                                 
1 La Porta et al. (1998) examine ownership of the ten largest firms in 49 countries; La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999) examine ownership of the twenty largest firms in 27 
wealthy countries; Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2002) examine ownership of firms in nine East 
Asian countries; and Faccio and Lang (2002) examine ownership of corporations in thirteen 
Western European countries. Holderness (2008) documents that large block holders also are 
prevalent among U.S. listed firms. 
2 Johnson et al. (2000) refer to such expropriation as tunneling, which they define as “the transfer 
of resources out of a company to its controlling shareholder (who is typically also a top 
manager).”  They discuss various forms of tunneling, as well as circumstances under which it is 
legal in some civil-law countries.  A number of studies, including Bertrand, Mehta and 
Mullainathan (2002), Bae, Kang and Kim (2002) and Joh (2003), analyze how tunneling affects 
firm value.  Djankov and Murrell (2002) and Denis and McConnell (2003) provide surveys of 
the literature on international corporate governance. 
3 See La Porta et al. (2000), p.20.  Also, see Coffee (1999) and Gilson (2000) for a discussion of 
the distinction between formal (what La Porta et al. refer to as legal) and functional convergence. 
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In this study, we examine the market reactions to three examples of “legal convergence” 
that occurred in China when the government’s Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission 
(“CSRC”) introduced new regulations aimed at reducing expropriation from minority 
shareholders by controlling block holders. The three regulations were all introduced in the 
second quarter of 2000 and were partly motivated by China’s successful attempt to gain entrance 
into the World Trade Organization.  The first new regulation substantially increased the rights of 
minority shareholders at a firm’s Annual Shareholders’ Meeting. Most importantly, the new 
regulation prohibited shareholders involved in related party trading from voting on the related 
party trading. The second regulation prohibited the issuance of loan guarantees by a firm to its 
controlling shareholder, and the third regulation improved the transparency and regulation of 
asset transfers to related parties.4   
This is the first study of which we are aware that uses standard event-study methodology 
to analyse the link between investor protection and firm value, thereby reducing potential 
endogeneity problems inherent in the use of cross-sectional regressions.  The causality between 
shareholder protection and firm value is clear: value changes, if any, are the result of the 
market’s assessment that corporate governance has improved, reducing expected future 
expropriation of minority shareholders.  
The prediction that share prices increase around the introduction of the new regulations 
assumes that the new regulations will be enforced by the regulator. This is consistent with the 
theoretical model of Glaeser, Johnson and Shleifer (2001), which predicts that, in emerging 
                                                 
4  The regulatory changes reflect the commitment of the Chinese government to improve 
corporate governance.  The World Bank (2002, p. 102) concludes that “corporate governance has 
moved to the center stage of enterprise reform in China,” and (p. 1) that many of the 
requirements for listed companies are “even stricter than in Hong Kong and other developed 
markets…and show the authorities’ determination to protect minority shareholders.” 
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markets with relatively weak legal systems, regulators can provide an effective substitute for 
ineffective judicial enforcement. An alternative view, particularly relevant for China, is that the 
new regulations will not be enforced or will be enforced selectively, favouring companies with 
strong links to the government. Because the government, directly or indirectly, controlled the 
majority of listed firms in China during the period under study, minority shareholders might be 
sceptical about the effectiveness of the new regulations. If this is the case, we expect to see no or 
only a weak price reaction around the introduction of the new regulations, especially for firms 
most closely linked to the Chinese government (See Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002)).  
The first part of our empirical analysis provides evidence of a ten-percent positive share 
market reaction around the introduction of the first regulation. This finding offers support for the 
model of La Porta et al. (2002, p.1168), which predicts that “poor shareholder protection is 
penalized with lower valuations.”  The market-wide price reactions around the second and third 
events are also positive but statistically insignificant. We discuss several reasons why our tests of 
market-wide price reactions might have limited power to test the impact of the regulatory events. 
The most important reason is that the regulations might have benefited only specific subsets of 
firms—for example, firms with the weakest governance or firms with the weakest ties to the 
government.  
Consequently, we focus on cross-sectional models in the remainder of our analysis, 
utilizing the expected differential reactions to the regulations by different subsets of firms. More 
specifically, we test the hypothesis that effective regulation will result in larger value increases 
for minority shareholders of firms that are more likely to be subject to expropriation by 
controlling block holders.  
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In our first set of cross-sectional tests, we use the total value of all potentially damaging 
related-party transactions occurring during the year before the regulations were introduced as a 
proxy for the degree of expropriation from minority shareholders. 5  Around all three events, we 
find that minority shareholders in firms with higher total values of related-party transactions 
experienced significantly larger abnormal returns than minority shareholders in firms with lower 
or zero total value of related-party transactions.  This is strong evidence that investors perceived 
the regulations as effective.  
We also find that, for the group of firms with the most direct ties to the Chinese 
government, abnormal returns are unrelated to the value of related party transactions. This latter 
result suggests that investors were sceptical that the CSRC—a State-controlled regulator—would 
enforce the new regulations at firms with close ties to the government.  
Our second set of cross-sectional tests analyse the relation between abnormal returns and 
less direct measures of expropriation by the controlling block holder, such as the cash-flow rights 
and identity of the controlling block holder, the presence of foreign shareholders, and the total 
shareholding of non-controlling block holders. Our results consistently show that minority 
shareholders of firms with weak corporate governance benefit disproportionately from the new 
regulations in the form of higher abnormal returns. This finding is consistent with the argument 
in Klapper and Love (2003) that shareholders of firms with weak governance are more reliant 
upon legal and regulatory protection from expropriation by controlling block holders. Moreover, 
consistent with the notion that regulators selectively enforce the new regulations, we find that 
minority shareholders in firms with private controlling block holders enjoy the largest value 
increases around the announcement of the new regulations.  
                                                 
5 Related-party transactions include transactions between the listed company and either its large 
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We contribute to the literature in at least five ways. First, we contribute to the literature 
on regulation as a substitute for judicial enforcement (La Porta et al. (2000); Glaeser, Johnson 
and Shleifer (2001); Klapper and Love (2003); Bushee and Leuz (2005)). Using robust event-
study methodology, we find significant positive abnormal returns accrue to firms with weak 
governance as proxied by the value of related-party transactions and a variety of less direct 
measures. We interpret these results as evidence that securities-market regulation can be 
effective in protecting minority shareholders from expropriation in a country with weak judicial 
enforcement 
Second, we contribute to the literature on “tunneling” (Johnson et al. (2000)) that 
analyses related-party transactions between listed firms and their controlling block holders 
(Cheung et al. (2007); Cheung, Rau and Stouraitis (2006); La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and 
Zamarripa (2003)). We use the value of related-party transactions to calculate our proxy for the 
degree of expropriation by controlling block holders and provide evidence that regulations 
designed to protect minority shareholders disproportionately benefited firms with higher values 
of related-party transactions. 
Third, we contribute to the literature on the importance of political connections (Fisman 
(2001); Johnson and Mitton (2003); Faccio, Masulis and McConnell (2006); Fan, Wong and 
Zhang (2007); Cheung et al. (2007)). We provide new evidence that, in a country with a weak 
judicial system, such as China, investors are sceptical that regulators will undertake actions that 
might harm controlling block holders with strong political connections. Specifically, we find that 
announcements of regulations designed to protect minority shareholders from expropriation by 
controlling block holders led to greater increases in value at firms with private block holders than 
                                                                                                                                                             
shareholders or entities controlled by those shareholders. 
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at firms with government block holders, with market-oriented SOE block holders falling in 
between.  This result is consistent with the theoretical model in Glaeser, Johnson and Shleifer 
(2001) that, even though regulators are motivated to enforce regulations because their careers 
and budgets depend on finding violators, they are, on the other hand, likely to reach politically 
desirable decisions. 
Fourth, we contribute to the literature on why State-owned firms perform poorly. The 
“political view” posits that politicians interfere and pursue political objectives other than profit 
maximization (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994), whereas the “managerial view” posits that States are 
poor monitors because there is no individual with strong incentive nor is there a public price to 
provide information (Laffont and Tirole, 1993). Here, we find that the Chinese government 
moved to improve corporate governance by strengthening regulations to protect minority 
investors and that these actions led to share price increases at firms with poor governance, but 
not at those with strong government ties in the form of direct State ownership. This is consistent 
with the political view that managers of State firms pursue political and/or personal objectives at 
the expense of minority shareholders, with complicit assistance of government regulators.6   
Finally, we contribute to the growing body of work on corporate governance in China 
(Sun and Tong (2003); Cull and Xu (2005); Allen, Qian and Qian (2005); Wei, Xie and Zhang 
(2005); Fan, Wong and Zhang (2005, 2007))—especially the group of studies that have 
abandoned the “official” ownership scheme, which classifies owners of non-tradable shares 
primarily into two categories—State Shares and Legal-Person Shares—in favour of 
                                                 
6 Other studies that analyse how State ownership affects the performance of partially privatized 
firms are Kole and Mulherin (1997); Sun and Tong (2003); Boubakri, Cosset and Guedhami 
(2005a); D’Souza, Megginson and Nash (2005); and Gupta (2005). 
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classifications based upon the identity of the ultimate owner (Firth, Fung and Rui (2006); 
Berkman, Cole and Fu (2007, 2008)).    
In the remainder of the article, we proceed as follows. Section 2 describes some of the 
salient institutional details of the Chinese share markets, while Section 3 describes each of the 
three regulatory changes designed to improve the protection of minority shareholders. In Section 
4, we describe our data and methodology and develop our hypotheses. In Section 5, we present 
our results, which are followed by a summary and conclusions in Section 6. 
 
2. Institutional Details of the Chinese Share Markets 
During the 1990s, the Chinese government corporatized and partially privatized almost a 
thousand State-owned enterprises (SOEs) through share-issuance privatizations on the two 
primary Chinese stock exchanges—the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and the Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange (SZSE). The corporatization and share-issuance privatization of large SOEs 
were central elements of the Chinese strategy towards creation of a “modern-enterprise system.”7 
In China, there are two official types of controlling block holders: holders of State shares 
and holders of Legal-Person shares.8 State shares are those held by government agencies (e.g., 
                                                 
7 Jones et al. (1999) coin the term “share-issuance privatizations.” Sun and Tong (2003) evaluate 
the changes in financial performance of Chinese firms following their share-issuance 
privatizations. 
8 This distinction between State shares and Legal-Person emanates from a 1994 regulation 
dealing with restructuring of SOEs. Article 8 of the Regulation for State-owned Shares in Stock 
Corporations, which was announced on November 3, 1994 by the State Reform Commission for 
Economic Restructuring and the State Assets Management Bureau, sets forth how contribution 
of State assets to a stock corporation are to be classified. If a stock corporation is created out of 
the assets of existing SOEs and the percentage of the stock corporation’s assets accounted for by 
contributed State assets is less than 50 then the assets are classified as State-owned Legal- 
Person shares; if greater than 50 then the assets are classified as State shares. If a subsidiary of 
an SOE is restructured as a stock company, then all of the assets should be classified as State-
owned Legal Person. If an entire SOE is restructured into a stock corporation, then all of the 
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the Bureau of State Property Management and local finance bureaus) and by some types of 
corporatized SOEs. For most listed companies, State shares make up the largest percentage 
ownership of any classification.  Legal-Person (LP) shares are those owned by domestic 
corporations or other non-individual legal persons. Hence, this category includes shares held by 
the government through legal-person entities as well as shares held by private entities, both 
domestic and foreign. Like State shares, Legal-Person shares cannot be traded on the two 
exchanges or transferred to foreign investors, but can be transferred to domestic corporations, 
when approved by the CSRC.9 
Individuals and domestic corporations are allowed to hold Tradable-A shares. Tradable-A 
shares are the only type of equity that can be publicly traded among domestic investors. In this 
study, the market price of a listed company refers to the price of Tradable-A shares, and the 
prices of such shares are used to measure the valuation effects of the regulations aimed at 
improving the protection of minority shareholders.10  
There are serious shortcomings in the official share classification for any analysis of 
corporate governance of listed firms in China. To illustrate the confusion, we refer to Table 5 in 
Delios et al. (2006), where the authors report the overlap between their 17 (ultimate) ownership 
categories and the official Share Classification. For example, of the 556 times a State Asset 
                                                                                                                                                             
assets should be classified as State share. If the stock corporation is newly set up, then assets 
from the government should be classified as State shares and assets from SOEs or their 
subsidiaries should be classified as State-owned Legal-Person shares. 
9 Berkman, Cole and Fu (2007) examine changes in market values and accounting returns for a 
sample of publicly traded Chinese firms around announcements of block-share transfers among 
government agencies, market-oriented State-owned enterprises and private investors. 
10 In addition to domestic shares, some firms have issued foreign shares (B-, H- and N-shares). 
B-shares are available to foreign investors and are traded on the two domestic exchanges, 
whereas H- and N-shares have an overseas listing. The governance structure for firms with an 
overseas listing is more restrictive, and we exclude firms with H- or N-shares from our later tests 
(see Xu and Wang, 1999). 
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Management Bureau (SAMB) was classified as a top-10 shareholder in a listed firm in their 
sample, the SAMB was officially classified as holder of State shares 105 times (19 percent), as a 
Legal Person shareholder 221 times (40 percent), and in 230 cases the SAMB was classified as 
Tradable-A shareholder or “Other”. Similarly, private corporations were officially classified as 
holders of State shares in 7.4 percent of the cases, as holder of Legal-Person shares in 59.8 
percent of the cases, and as holder of Tradable-A shares or “Other” in 32.8 percent of the cases.  
Because of these ambiguities, we adopt the classification scheme of Chinese ownership 
developed by the National University of Singapore (“NUS”) Business School and described in 
Delios et al. (2006). The NUS-classification produces 17 detailed classes of non-tradable shares, 
which we regroup in three groups of ultimate owners. The groups are as follows (where we refer 
to the Delios et al. (2006) detailed classifications in parentheses). State Bureaucrats includes: 
central government (1); local governments (2); government ministries (3); government bureaus 
(4); State asset-investment bureaus (6); State asset-management bureaus (7); State research 
institutes (10); and State-owned banks (16). The group Market-Oriented SOEs includes 
companies that formerly were government ministries (5); market-oriented state-owned 
enterprises (9) and infrastructure construction companies (8). The Private Entities classification 
includes security companies (11); investment funds (12); private companies (13); private 
individuals (14); foreign companies and individuals (15); and work unions (17).11  
                                                 
11 In order to sharpen the distinction between the three main ownership groups—State 
Bureaucrats, Market Oriented SOEs and Private Entities—we have repeated all tests excluding 
firms where the controlling block holder belongs to one of the following categories: companies 
that formerly were government ministries (NUS category 5); State research institutes (NUS 
category 10); foreign companies and individuals (15); State-owned banks (NUS category 16) and 
work unions (NUS category 17). Our results are robust to exclusion of these 63 firms from our 
sample. 
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Regulators typically required that Tradable-A shares account for more than 25% of total 
outstanding shares when a company went public.  Until July 1999, individuals were prohibited 
from holding more than 0.5% of total shares outstanding for any listed company; subsequently, 
the legal maximum for individual shareholders was increased to 5.0%. The legal maximum for 
individual shareholdings and the absence of cumulative voting procedures significantly enhance 
the control rights of a firm’s largest shareholder. The World Bank (2002, p. xiii), concluded that, 
in China, “. . . large shareholders often overstep the bounds of shareholder meetings and boards 
of directors and exercise direct effective control.”  
 
3. Regulations to Improve Minority Shareholder Protection 
Minority-shareholder rights are poorly protected in China. Based on the index of investor 
protection developed by La Porta et al. (1999), MacNeil (2002) calculates an index score of two 
for China compared with a world average of three and a maximum of six. MacNeil also states 
that, in drafting the Company and Securities Law in China, lawmakers were primarily concerned 
with protecting State control over listed firms. Furthermore, courts in China have a long tradition 
of protecting State interests and have very little experience with private plaintiff-driven 
litigation. Clarke (2003, p. 504) writes “if corporate governance reform is understood to mean 
inserting appropriate private rights of action into the Company Law, it is unlikely to lead 
anywhere very soon.” 
The CSRC is designated as the regulator for securities activities. The CSRC has wide-
ranging powers in respect of authorization, rule-making, investigation and enforcement of all 
aspects of the securities markets (see Zhu (2000)). The regulatory changes that we study were the 
first substantial improvement in minority-shareholder protection implemented by the CSRC, and 
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suggest an increased willingness by the Chinese leadership to subordinate the interests of 
controlling block holders (usually the State) to the interests of other shareholders (MacNeil 
(2002) and World Bank (2002)). Consistent with the argument in Glaeser, Johnson and Shleifer 
(2001), we expect that the regulation and enforcement by a specialized and relatively efficient 
regulator is an effective substitute for judicial enforcement.12 
The three regulatory changes we study were announced within a two-month period 
during early 2000. We briefly review each regulation in this section and refer the reader to 
Appendix I for a more detailed description of each. 
The first event is the introduction of a regulation that substantially increased the voting 
rights of minority shareholders at shareholder meetings. Among other things, this new 
regulation: prohibited shareholders involved in related party trading from voting at the 
shareholding meetings on the related party trading, empowered small shareholders to propose 
motions at a firm’s shareholders Annual Meeting; required that candidates for directors be voted 
on individually rather than as a group; and granted new legal standing in Chinese courts to 
shareholders disputing procedures used or resolutions passed at a firm’s Annual Meeting. 
The second and third events that we study reduced the ability of controlling shareholders 
to expropriate minority shareholders in more direct manners. The second regulation prohibited a 
listed firm from issuing a loan guarantee to its controlling shareholder or related party. The third 
regulation greatly improved the transparency and regulation of asset transfers to related parties. 
The following sections examine the effects of the introduction of the new regulations on 
the value of Tradable-A shares in the Chinese share markets.  
                                                 
12 Chen et al. (2005) argue that the CSRC is not a “toothless tiger.” They show enforcement 
actions by the CSRC result in negative stock returns, more frequent auditor changes and more 
frequent CEO dismissal. 
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4. Methodology and Data 
We use standard event-study methodology to analyse the link between investor protection 
and firm value. In addition to reducing potential endogeneity problems inherent in the use of 
cross-sectional regressions that relate investor protection to firm value, event studies analyze the 
change in value for the same sample of firms before and after the changes in the regulatory 
environment. As a result, we do not need to control for firm heterogeneity. A disadvantage of our 
approach is that market participants might anticipate the regulatory changes, in which case our 
results provide only a partial estimate of the value changes resulting from improving corporate 
governance.  
 
   4.1. Market-Wide Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
To test the overall market impact of the new regulations, we form an equally weighted 
portfolio of all 887 sample firms (see below) and analyse the cumulative abnormal returns 
around the event. Our event window is taken from one day before the CSRC release of the new 
regulations until one day after the regulation was first published in the newspaper (Appendix I 
lists the exact dates for each event). We choose this definition of the event period, which results 
in relatively long event windows, based on our observation that share prices react around both 
the initial CSRC release day and the subsequent newspaper announcement. We conjecture that 
the prolonged reaction is the result of the initial release to a limited number of market 
participants including the securities regulatory offices, the stock exchanges, and the listed 
companies. The restricted release makes it likely that many, if not most, minority shareholders 
receive the information only after publication in the newspapers.  
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We estimate two models to test the market-wide price reaction to the regulatory changes. 
First, we estimate the cumulative mean-adjusted returns around each event using the following 
model: 
 
Market Return t  =  β0   +  Σ β J  Event J  +  ε t ,  J  =  1 to 3    (1) 
 
 
where:  
 
Market Return t is the return for day t on the equally weighted market portfolio of firms 
only listed on the Chinese stock exchanges;13  
β0 is the mean portfolio return during the sample period; 
Event J, J = 1 to 3, are dummy variables that equal 1 / n J for the dates within the event 
window of length n J days for the Jth regulation, and 0 otherwise, where n1 = 11, n2 = 10 
and n3 = 23;14   
β J, J = 1 to 3, are the estimated cumulative mean-adjusted returns during each event 
window J;  
ε t is an i.i.d. random-error term for day t. 
Second, as a robustness check intended to control for market-wide price movements 
unrelated to the regulations, we estimate a model that includes the contemporaneous return on an 
equally weighted portfolio of 24 firms from China that are listed on the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange (HK Return t). These firms have their headquarters and business activities in mainland 
China, but their shares are only listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. We expect that the 
                                                 
13 When we use a value-weighted market index, we find similar results. 
14 We define the dummy variable as equal to 1/n, where n is the length of the event window, so 
that the coefficient on our dummy variable measures the cumulative adjusted return over the 
entire event window.  Were we to define the dummy variable as equal to 1, then the coefficient 
would instead measure the average daily adjusted return over the event window. 
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new regulations are of little importance to these firms, as Chinese companies with an overseas 
listing are subject to additional provisions in their articles of association that already 
substantially limited the power of their controlling shareholders.15 The empirical model is: 
 
Market Return t = β0  +  Σ β J   Event J  +  β 4  HK Returnt  +  ε t   (2) 
 
where: 
HK Returnt is the return for day t on the equally weighted portfolio of 24 firms from 
China that are listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange; and 
Market Return t, β0, Event J, βJ and ε t are defined as above. 
We estimate each model over a period of 250 trading days that ends July 25, 2000—one day 
after the newspaper release of the asset transfer regulation (event 3).  
As another test of robustness, we re-estimate eq. (1) and eq. (2) where we redefine the 
event windows to incorporate, for each regulation, two five-day event windows centred on the 
CSRC release date and first publication date. This shortens the length of our event windows so as 
to limit the effects of potentially confounding events. We refer to these as Five-day Event 
Windows whereas we refer to our primary windows as Long Event Windows. 16  
 
                                                 
15 MacNeill (2002, p. 51) argues that the amendments in the articles of overseas listed firms 
“should be viewed as a considerable enhancement of the governance structure by comparison 
with domestic-only listed Chinese companies.”  There are 24 firms from China that are only 
listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, and 19 Chinese firms that are listed in Hong Kong and 
also on one of the two Chinese stock exchanges. Inclusion of these 19 firms in HK Returnt does 
not change any of our results. Note that Cheung et al. (2006) show that the likelihood of 
connected transactions in Chinese firms listed in Hong Kong is higher than for Hong-Kong-
based firms. 
16 We have estimated both models over longer periods of 500 and 750 trading days, and have 
extended model (2) by including the world market index. The results are robust to these changes. 
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4.2. Cross-Sectional Differences in Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
In addition to testing market-wide changes in value attributable to improved shareholder 
protection, we also test whether the new regulations have differential impacts on firms depending 
on the extent to which minority shareholders might be expropriated by the controlling block 
holders. We expect that firms where minority shareholders face greater expropriation should 
disproportionately benefit from the new regulations. In our first set of cross-sectional tests, we 
use the total value of the related-party transactions in the year preceding the announcement of the 
new regulations as an observable proxy for (potential) minority shareholder expropriation. We 
refer to this measure as EXPROP. We hypothesize that, during the event windows, firms with 
high values of EXPROP outperform firms with low values of EXPROP.  
We also test whether the identity of the controlling block holder influences the relation 
between EXPROP and changes in firm value. Specifically, we test whether the relation is 
stronger among firms controlled by State Bureaucrats, MOSOEs or Private Entities. Because 
State Bureaucrats have the closest ties with the Chinese government, we conjecture that State 
Bureaucrats are least likely to be the target of regulatory action aimed at reducing expropriation. 
Consequently, we conjecture that, among firms that have substantial related-party transactions, 
the beneficial effects of the new regulations is smallest for minority shareholders in listed firms 
controlled by State Bureaucrats. Similarly, because Private Entities have the weakest links with 
the government, we conjecture that minority shareholders of listed firms controlled by Private 
Entities will gain most from the new regulations.  
In our second set of cross-sectional tests, we use several more indirect proxies of the 
likelihood of minority shareholder expropriation. In these tests, we focus on the hypothesis that 
shareholders of firms with weak governance are more reliant upon legal and regulatory 
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protection from expropriation by controlling block holders than are shareholders of firms with 
strong governance (Klapper and Love (2003)). Therefore, shareholders of firms with weak 
corporate governance should benefit disproportionately from the new regulations.  
As proxies for the value of firm-specific corporate governance, we use: the cash-flow 
rights of the controlling shareholder, the type of controlling shareholder (“State Bureaucrats,” 
“MOSOEs,” and “Private Entities”), the dominance of the controlling shareholder (“Non-
Controlling Block Holders”) and the presence of foreign shareholders (“B-Shares”). In addition, 
we include dummy variables that indicate whether the CEO is the Chairman of the Board (“CEO 
is Chair”) and whether or not the firm has at least one independent director (“Independent 
Director”). 
 
4.2.1 Related Party Transactions and Cumulative Abnormal Returns  
Cheung et al. (2007) classify related-party transactions into: i) transactions that are a 
priori likely to result in expropriation of the listed firm’s minority shareholders; ii) transactions 
likely to benefit the listed firm’s minority shareholders; and iii) strategic transactions that are, 
perhaps, not expropriation. Our direct, firm-specific measure of expropriation—EXPROP—is 
defined as the sum of the values of all transactions likely to result in expropriation of minority 
shareholders for each firm in 1999, scaled by the market capitalisation of the firm as of the end 
of 1999.17  
We hypothesize that, during the event windows, firms with high expropriation (proxied 
by high values of EXPROP) outperform firms with low expropriation (proxied by low values of 
                                                 
17 We obtain similar results if we use the unscaled value of related-party transactions, and if we 
scale by total assets or total revenue. The results in Cheung et al. (2007) are based on values of 
related-party transactions scaled by market capitalization. 
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EXPROP).18  To test this hypothesis, we use a portfolio time-series regression, which is designed 
to deal with the econometric problem that arises when there is cross-correlation in the firm return 
processes from which the CARs are estimated.  Cross-correlation is likely in our setting because, 
for each event, the event date and event windows are identical across sample firms. The portfolio 
time-series regression provides unbiased estimates of the coefficients along with standard errors 
that fully account for cross-sectional heteroskedasticity and cross-security dependence (see 
Sefcik and Thompson (1986)).19  
We implement the portfolio time-series approach by forming a portfolio that is long in 
high-EXPROP firms and short in low-EXPROP. We define high-EXPROP firms as those in the 
highest EXPROP tercile and low-EXPROP firms as those in the lowest EXPROP tercile. As a 
robustness test, we also show results for portfolios based upon the lower half (fifth) and upper 
half (fifth) of the EXPROP distribution. We hypothesize that the regulatory changes are more 
beneficial for firms with high expropriation than for firms with low expropriation.  In other 
words, we expect our portfolio to have positive abnormal returns during the event periods. To 
control for market risk, we include the return on an equally weighted portfolio of firms listed on 
the Chinese stock exchanges:  
 
                                                 
18 This hypothesis rests on the assumption that investors are able to identify and discount firms 
with a high level of expropriation. In our results section we present evidence that strongly 
supports this assumption. 
19 The problems of heteroscedasticity and cross-sectional dependence can, in principle, also be 
addressed in a generalized-least-squares (GLS) regression. Several studies, however, show that 
GLS tests are highly sensitive to errors in specifying the abnormal return model. (See, for 
example, Chandra and Balachandran (1990)). Grammatikos and Saunders (1990) apply the 
Sefcik and Thompson methodology to study the effect of bank loan-loss reserve announcements 
on bank stock returns. Forbes (2002) uses the Sefcik and Thompson methodology to study the 
international transmission of financial crises at the firm level. Espahbodi et al. (2002) use this 
methodology to analyse cross-sectional differences in stock price reactions to proposals to 
change the way firms have to account for stock-based compensation. 
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R (High-EXPROP t ) – R (Low-EXPROP t ) = β0 + Σ β J  Event J + β 4  Market Return t + ε t (3) 
 
 
where:  
 R (High-EXPROP t) is the return for day t on an equally weighted portfolio of the highest 
third (half, fifth) firms based upon EXPROP; 
R (Low-EXPROP t) is the return for day t on an equally weighted portfolio of the lowest 
third (half, fifth) firms based upon EXPROP; 
β J, J = 1 to 3, give the estimated differences in the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) 
of the High-EXPROP and Low-EXPROP portfolios during each event window J; and 
Market Return t, Event J and ε t are defined as above. 
As before, we estimate the model over a period of 250 trading days that ends one day after the 
newspaper release of asset transfer regulation (Event 3). 
 
4.2.2 Ownership Structure and Differences in Cumulative Abnormal Returns  
Following La Porta et al. (2002), we assume that the ultimate owner of the largest 
shareholder has effective control over a firm.20 We consider three variables that might mitigate 
the incentive of the controlling shareholder to expropriate minority shareholders and positively 
impact a firm’s value. 
First, the incentive to expropriate outside investors is moderated by the cash-flow 
ownership of the controlling shareholder (see La Porta et al. (2002) and Claessens et al. (2002)). 
The greater are the cash-flow rights of the largest shareholder, the smaller is the difference in her 
cash-flow and control rights (where we assume that the ultimate owner of the largest shareholder 
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has effective control). Hence, we expect the beneficial effect of the regulation for minority 
shareholders to decrease with the cash-flow rights of the controlling shareholder. Our empirical 
model includes a dummy variable (“Cash-Flow Rights > 30%”) that assumes a value of one if 
the largest shareholder owns more than 30 percent of all shares outstanding, and zero 
otherwise.21  
Second, we define a variable that measures the control rights of the non-controlling block 
holders.  Non-Controlling Block holders is the sum of the shareholdings of the second through 
tenth largest shareholder. Lins (2003) finds that large, non-management block holders can act as 
a partial substitute for weak institutional governance mechanisms. We expect the ability of the 
largest shareholder to expropriate firm value decreases as the relative shareholdings of block 
holders with the ability and incentive to monitor the actions of the largest block holder increase 
(see, for example, Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000)).  
Third, we include a dummy variable (“B-Share”) that is equal to one for firms having 
both A- and B-shares outstanding and equal to zero for all other firms. Some Chinese firms offer 
two classes of shares: Class-A shares, which can only be held by domestic investors, and Class-B 
                                                                                                                                                             
20 Note that the legal maximum for individual shareholdings in China and the absence of 
cumulative voting procedures reinforces the idea that the ultimate owner of the largest 
shareholder has effective control. 
21 We would have preferred to use data on cash-flow rights and control rights of the ultimate 
controlling shareholder. Unfortunately this data for listed firms in China is only available from 
year-end 2002. Fan, Wong and Zhang (2005) show that, across a sample of 750 State-controlled 
firms, the average ratio of cash-flow to voting rights of the ultimate owner equals 0.96. For the 
62 listed firms in their sample that are controlled by private entities, they find that the average 
ratio of the cash-flow to voting rights is 0.54. Given the larger wedge between cash-flow and 
control rights at listed firms with private entities as ultimate owner, we conjecture that 
expropriation of minority shareholder wealth is more severe at firms controlled by private 
owners. 
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shares, which can only be held by foreign investors.22 Most Class-B shareholders are 
international financial institutions, whereas most Class-A shareholders are individual investors, 
with only limited ownership by domestic financial institutions (see Mei, Scheinkman and Xiong 
(2004)). In addition to the difference in investor sophistication, firms with only Class-A shares 
use Chinese accounting rules (PRC GAAP) to prepare their financial statements, whereas firms 
with Class-A and Class-B shares report their results based on both PRC GAAP and International 
Accounting Standards (IAS). In general, IAS are regarded as providing superior transparency as 
compared to PRC GAAP (World Bank (2002)).  Given the differences in the level of 
sophistication of the shareholders and the level of transparency of the financial statements, we 
expect that controlling shareholders of firms with Class-B shares are less likely to expropriate 
minority shareholders. 
We also include a variable that indicates whether the largest owner of the listed firm is a 
State Bureaucrat, a MOSOE or a Private Entity. As discussed before, the type of controlling 
block holder is important because it might proxy for the likelihood of regulatory action in case of 
expropriation by the controlling block holder. We expect regulators are most likely to pursue 
expropriation by private controlling block holders and least likely to pursue State Bureaucrat 
controlling block holders. 
 Finally, we include dummy variables that equal one when the Chief Executive Officer is 
the Chairman of the Board, (“CEO is Chair”) and when the firm has at least one independent 
director (“Independent Director”).  
In estimating the association between the cumulative abnormal returns and the ownership 
variables, we include firm size and leverage as controls. Firm Size is defined as the natural log of 
                                                 
22 On February 19, 2001, the CSRC announced that Chinese citizens would be allowed to hold 
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the total assets as per end of 1999. Leverage is the defined as the book value of debt divided by 
the book value of total assets. 
As before, we employ the portfolio time-series regression methodology, which involves 
three steps. First, we orthogonalize our nine independent variables so that each has zero 
correlation with the other independent variables.23 Second, for each of the nine orthogonalized 
variables, we construct a portfolio that is short on firms in the lowest third (half, fifth) and long 
on firms in the highest third (half, fifth) of the orthogonalized variable’s distribution. Third, we 
regress the returns for each of the nine portfolios on the market return and a dummy variable 
(Events), using the following model:24  
 
R(OV-Hight)  – R(OV-Lowt) = β0 +  β 1  Events  + β 2  Market Returnt + ε t  (8) 
 
 
where:  
R (OV-High t) is the return for day t on an equally weighted portfolio of the highest third 
(half, fifth) firms based upon orthogonalized variable OV (Cash-Flow Rights >30% i, 
Non-Controlling Block Holders i, B-Shares i, MOSOE i, Private i, CEO is Chair i, 
Independent Director i, Firm Size i or Leverage i);  
R (OV-Low t) is the return for day t on an equally weighted portfolio of the lowest third 
(half, fifth) firms based upon orthogonalized variable OV (Cash-Flow Rights >30% i, 
                                                                                                                                                             
and trade Class-B shares. 
23 The nine variables are Cash-Flow Rights > 30% i  ; Non-Controlling Block Holders i  ; B-
Shares i ; MOSOE i; Private Entity i ; CEO is Chair i ;  Independent Director i ; Firm Size i ; and 
Leverage i. Each of the nine variables is replaced by the residual from a regression of that 
variable on an intercept and the other eight independent variables. 
24 We combine the three event-dummy variables (Event 1, Event 2 and Event 3) into one dummy 
variable (Events) that equals one during each day of the three event windows to increase the 
power of our tests. Results from analysing each of the three events separately are available from 
the authors.  
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Non-Controlling Block Holders i, B-Shares i, MOSOE i, Private i, CEO is Chair i, 
Independent Director i, Firm Size i or Leverage i); 
Events is a dummy variable that equals 1 / 44 for the dates within the three long event 
windows, and 1 / 30 for the dates within the three 5-day event windows;  
β 1 gives the estimated difference in the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of the high-
OV and low-OV portfolios during the three event windows; and 
Market Return t, Event J and ε t are defined as above. 
As before, the model is estimated over a period of 250 trading days that ends July 25, 2001. 
 
4.3 Data 
The data used in this study include information on accounting values, stock prices and 
ownership structure.  We obtained accounting data and data on related-party transactions from 
the CSMAR/GTA database for 918 companies listed on the Chinese Stock Exchanges as of year-
end 1999. We also obtained information on the number of independent directors, and the identity 
of the CEO and Chairman of the Board from CSMAR/GTA. We obtained daily share-price 
information for each of our sample firms from Datastream. Classification of the ten largest 
shareholders into State Bureaucrats, MOSOES, and Private Entities is based on Delios et al. 
(2006).25  
From our initial sample of 918 firms, we delete 19 firms that are cross-listed on overseas 
exchanges (see footnote 10). We delete 2 firms for which we can not obtain sufficient 
information on the shareholdings of the largest 10 shareholders. Finally, we define 23 separate 
industry sectors at the level of two-digit standard industrial classification, which we obtained 
                                                 
25 The data are available from http://www.bschool.nus.edu.sg/staff/bizakd/owner.htm. 
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from the CSRC. To obtain reliable estimates of industry-adjusted Q for our sample firms, we 
delete 10 firms from our sample where there are fewer than five firms in the industry. The three 
sets of deletions leave us with a final sample of 887 firms.   
 
5. Results 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A of Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the related-party transactions and 
shows that, in 1999, a total of 6,113 related-party transactions were recorded in the annual 
reports of our sample firms.26 Following Cheung et al. (2007), we classify 495 of these 
transactions as potentially beneficial for the listed company because it received cash, loans or 
guarantees from the related party. We classify the remaining 5,618 transactions as (potentially) 
harmful. Overall, the beneficial transactions have a value of RMB 39.77 billion whereas the 
harmful transactions have a value of RMB 296.34 billion.27 Within the harmful transactions, the 
most numerous category involves sale or purchase of commodities (2,644) which also accounts 
for most of the aggregate value (RMB 211.22 billion or 71.5%); there also were 583 transactions 
involving provision of services, with a total value of RMB 13.76 billion or 4.7% and 540 
transactions involving the purchase, transfer or swap of assets, with a total value of RMB 15.69 
billion or 5.3%. 
                                                 
26 Appendix 2 contains a detailed description of the different types of related party transactions. 
27 Cheung et al. (2007) analyse related party transactions between Chinese listed firms and their 
state-owned block holders during 2001-2002. The median transaction value of the harmful 
related party transactions in their sample is 43 million RMB, and the median value scaled by the 
market value of the firm is 1 percent. Cheung  et al. point out that in China enforcement of the 
rules is weak, and there may be companies that fail to disclose connected transactions, or 
understate the value of the deal in their financial statements. 
 
 
 24
Panel B of Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for EXPROP, our expropriation proxy, 
which we calculate as the aggregate value of harmful related-party transactions for each firm 
during 1999 (2001) divided by the firm’s year-end 1999 market capitalisation. For the full 
sample, the mean and median values of EXPROP for 1999 were 6.54% and 1.85%, respectively. 
In 2001, the corresponding values were 33.1% and 1.92%.  For the total sample, there is no 
significant change in the mean and median value of EXPROP between 1999 and 2001. 
The second part of Panel B shows the mean values of EXPROP for our three groups of 
controlling block holders: State Bureaucrats, MOSOEs and Private Entities. We also report the 
average quintile rank for each ownership type (ranks range from 0 for firms in the lowest quintile 
of the EXPROP distribution to 4 for firms in the highest quintile of the EXPROP distribution). In 
1999, the highest mean value of EXPROP and the highest mean rank are observed at MOSOEs 
whereas the lowest mean of EXPROP and the lowest mean rank are observed at State 
Bureaucrats. In 2001 MOSOEs still have the highest mean and the highest mean rank, however 
the lowest mean of EXPROP and the lowest rank are now observed at Private Entities. The last 
column indicates that the increases in the mean value of EXPROP and the mean rank for State 
Bureaucrats are significant.  
In the last two rows of Table1, Panel B we report the p-value of the test whether the 
differences in EXPROP and ΔEXPROP between the three ownership types are significant.  
When we use the values of EXPROP and ΔEXPROP the differences are never significant. 
However, using ranks we find that the difference in EXPROP between the three ownership types 
is significant both before and after the regulatory changes. We also find that there are significant 
differences between the ownership types in terms of the change in the mean rank, suggesting that 
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State Bureaucrats were least responsive to the new regulation and Private Entities were most 
responsive to the new regulation.28 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for our analysis variables both for the entire sample 
of 887 firms and for three groups of firms ranked into terciles based on the level of our 
expropriation proxy EXPROP (the sum of the value of all the potentially harmful related-party 
transactions that took place in 1999, scaled by the market value of the firm as of December 
1999). The last column presents the p-value of a t-test that the means are the same for the group 
with low EXPROP and high EXPROP.  
Table 2 shows a negative association between industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q and EXPROP, 
suggesting that investors do discount firms that are exposed to more expropriation by the 
controlling block holder. Industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q is measured as of year-end 1999 and is 
calculated as the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt divided by the 
book value of total assets. We control for differences in Q across industries by calculating the 
median Q for each industry and then by subtracting the appropriate industry median from each 
firm’s Q. The average industry-adjusted Q for the high EXPROP group is −0.25, whereas the 
average industry-adjusted Q for the low EXPROP group is 1.04. This difference is significant at 
the 1-percent level.  
There is no significant relation between Leverage and EXPROP, but firms with higher 
EXPROP are significantly larger in terms of total assets.  
Firms with a high level of expropriation are more likely to have a MOSOE as controlling 
block holder and are less likely to have a State Bureaucrat as controlling block holder. There is 
                                                 
28 The conclusions do not change when we measure the relevant variables over a two-year period 
before the regulation and a two- or five-year period after the regulations. 
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no significant difference in the likelihood of having a Private Entity as controlling block holder 
for firms in the low and high EXPROP group.  
Contrary to our expectations, but consistent with Cheung et al. (2007), we find that firms 
with high EXPROP are more likely to have controlling block holders that own 30 percent of the 
shares or more. Cheung et al. (2007) argue that expropriation is concentrated in listed firms with 
the highest state ownership because these are firms where the managers of the SOE might find it 
easiest to carry out connected transactions.  Consistent with this explanation, non-controlling 
block holders own a larger percentage of the shares of firms that have low expropriation than of 
firms with a high level of expropriation.  
Surprisingly, low expropriation firms are more likely to have the same person as CEO 
and Chairman of the Board. There is no significant difference between the low and high 
EXPROP groups in the proportion of firms with independent directors or the proportion of firms 
with B-shares.  
  
5.2 Market-Wide Impact of the Regulations 
As detailed in section 4.1, we use standard event-study methodology to obtain mean-
adjusted and market-adjusted abnormal returns around the announcements of each regulatory 
change.  In Table 3, we present the results of this analysis.  In Columns 2 and 3, we present 
results using the Long Event Windows, whereas, in Columns 4 and 5, we present the results 
using the Five-day Event Windows. For each of the three events, Columns 2 and 4 present 
cumulative mean-adjusted returns and Columns 3 and 5 present cumulative market-adjusted 
returns, where we use a portfolio of Chinese firms that trade on the Hong -Kong Stock Exchange 
in an attempt to control for market-wide movements unrelated to the regulatory events. 
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In Column 2 of Table 3, we see that the cumulative mean-adjusted return for the 11-day 
Long Event Window around the announcement of the shareholder-meeting regulation is a 
positive 10.1 percent. This increase in the market’s market value is significant at better than the 
five- percent level (p-value = 0.03). Around the announcements of the ban of related guarantees 
and the restriction on asset transfers, the cumulative mean-adjusted returns are positive 1.1 
percent and positive 1.9 percent, respectively, but these abnormal returns are not significantly 
different from zero. In Column 3 of Table 3, we see that the cumulative market-adjusted returns 
are very similar to the cumulative mean-adjusted returns shown in Column 2. Moreover, when 
we use Five-day Event windows, the results are largely unchanged. 
The high volatility in the Chinese stock market, combined with the long event windows, 
make it difficult to discern significant price reactions to market-wide events. An additional 
problem is the presence of several confounding events. The most significant confounding events 
were during the first event window: on May 19, the opening of a second board was announced, 
as was the opening of the market to Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII).29 It is 
important to note that these confounding events do not affect the cross-sectional results to the 
extent that the impact of these events on stock prices is not related to the level of expropriation or 
the quality of corporate governance.  
In the next section, we investigate whether there is evidence of cross-sectional 
differences in share price reaction based on differences along these two dimensions. 
 
                                                 
29 When we exclude May 19 from our event window, the abnormal return around the first event 
is around 8 percent. For all four models, CARs are significant at the 5 percent level. 
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5.3 Related Party Transactions and Cross-Sectional Differences in CARs 
This section presents the results of our cross-sectional tests based on EXPROP. We first 
present two regression models that validate EXPROP as measure of expropriation of minority 
shareholders.  
 
5.3.1 Validity of the EXPROP measure 
In Panel A of Table 4, we present the results of a cross-sectional regression where our 
measure of firm-specific expropriation - EXPROP i - is regressed against several corporate 
governance characteristics and firm characteristics. In Panel B of Table 4, we analyse the relation 
between EXPROP i and industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q, controlling for the same corporate 
governance characteristics and firm characteristics.  
Panel A of Table 4 shows a positive and highly significant relation between firm size as 
measured by the natural log of total assets and (scaled) expropriation activity. Leverage is not 
significantly related to EXPROP. Related-party transactions have a larger value for firms that 
have a Private Entity or a MOSOE as controlling shareholder. This result is consistent with the 
conjecture that Private Entities and MOSOEs have stronger incentives to maximize profits than 
State Bureaucrats and, therefore, are more likely to engage in expropriation of minority 
shareholders of the listed firms under their control. Surprisingly, there is no relation between 
expropriation activity and concentrated ownership. We had expected to find significant negative 
coefficients for the interaction variables of ownership type (especially Private Entity and 
MOSOE) and the dummy variable indicating that cash flow rights are larger than 30 percent.  
Consistent with our expectations we find that expropriation is lower if the listed firm has 
issued B-Shares. Similarly, expropriation is lower when Non-Controlling Block Holders own 
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more shares, and the impact of this shareholding is larger if the non-controlling shares are held 
by private entities. This finding is consistent with Berkman et al. (2008) who report that firms 
with higher percentage ownership by private non-controlling block holders are less likely to 
issue related guarantees. 
Finally, we find that whether the CEO is Chairman and the presence of Independent 
Directors are unrelated to the level of expropriation. 
Panel B of Table 4 presents the results of a regression of industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q on 
the same set of explanatory variables, plus the level of expropriation. Consistent with earlier 
research, we find industry-adjusted Q decreases with firm size and leverage. Consistent with the 
notion that MOSOEs and Private Entities have a stronger incentive to maximize firm value, we 
find that Q is higher if the firm has a Private Entity or MOSOE as controlling shareholder. 
Tobin’s Q is also higher for firms with high non-controlling ownership from Private Entities and 
MOSOEs.  Finally, we find that Tobin’s Q is lower for firms with a high level of expropriation, 
again indicating that investors discount these firms.    
 
5.3.2 Related-Party Transactions and Cross-Sectional Differences in CARs 
In Table 5, we report the results from estimating eq. (3)—our tests for difference in the 
CARs of the portfolio of the high and low expropriation firms.  For each of the three regulatory 
changes, Panel A of Table 5 reports the results based on splitting the full sample into three 
groups based upon the value of EXPROP. In Panels B1 – B3 of Table 5, we present the results 
when the sample is further split based on the ownership type of the largest share holder. Finally, 
Panel C of Table 5 reports the cumulative abnormal returns for the hedge portfolio cumulated 
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across all three events when the full sample is split into two, three and five groups based on the 
value of EXPROP. 
Panel A of Table 5 shows that the high EXPROP portfolio outperforms the low EXPROP 
portfolio for each of the three events, and that this outperformance is significant at the one-
percent level for the shareholder meeting regulation and the asset transfer regulation, and the 10-
percent level for the related-guarantee regulation. Around the announcement of the new 
shareholder-meeting rules, the portfolio of firms in the high-EXPROP tercile outperformed the 
portfolio of firms in the low-EXPROP tercile by 3.5 percent. Around the announcement of the 
ban of related guarantees, this difference is 1.8 percent; and around the announcement of the 
tighter rules on asset transfers, the difference is 5.2 percent. If we sum across the three events, 
the total out-performance of the high-EXPROP group over the low-EXPROP group is more than 
ten percentage points. 
It is instructive to note that returns around the announcement of the regulation on asset 
transfers show the largest difference between the high- and low-expropriation portfolios. This 
finding is consistent with Johnson et al. (2000) and Bertrand et al. (2002), who show that non-
arms length transactions among related firms are an important channel for “tunneling.”  
Panels B1-B3 of Table 5 present the CARs around the three regulatory events for 
different groups based on the identity of the controlling block holder (State Bureaucrat, MOSOE 
or Private Entity). More specifically, for the stocks in each ownership group, we form zero-cost 
portfolios that are long the tercile of high-expropriation stocks and short the tercile of low-
expropriation stocks. For State Bureaucrats, there is no evidence that high-EXPROP firms 
significantly outperform low-EXPROP firms around the announcements of the new regulations. 
For the group of MOSOEs, the out-performance of high-EXPROP firms relative to low-EXPROP 
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firms is positive for all events and significant at the 5% level for the shareholder meeting and 
asset transfer events. The most noticeable out-performance of high-EXPROP firms relative to 
low-EXPROP firms is observed for the group of firms controlled by Private Entities. The CAR 
around each of the events is significant at the 5%-level and the total CAR across all three events 
is 18.2 percent. These results are consistent with our hypothesis that the regulation is likely to be 
perceived as more (less) effective for firms where the controlling block holder has weaker 
(stronger) ties with the government.30  
In Panel C of Table 5, we report the cumulative abnormal return where we cumulate 
across all three regulatory events, for portfolios that are long in high-EXPROP firms and short in 
low-EXPROP firms. The results in the first (second/third) column are based on portfolios where 
the high-EXPROP firms are those in the highest EXPROP half (third/fifth) and low-EXPROP 
firms are those in the lowest EXPROP half (third/fifth). For the full sample and also for the 
subsamples of MOSOEs and Private Entities, the cumulative abnormal return on the hedge 
portfolio increases if the portfolio contains stocks with more extreme values of EXPROP. For the 
total sample, the CAR increases from 7.4 percent to 11.7 percent when we move from two 
groups to five groups. For MOSOEs, the CAR is 9.0 percent when we split the sample in two 
groups, and 15.1 percent when we split the sample into five groups. Finally, for Private Entities, 
the CAR across all three events equals 10.4 percent when we split the sample into two groups 
and equals 20.3 percent when we split the sample into five groups. 
To summarize, our results suggest that the market found the three regulations to be 
credible attempts at improving corporate governance of Chinese firms. For each of the three 
                                                 
30 The results are also consistent with Cheung et al. (2007), who find that minority shareholders 
discount a firm more in reaction to a connected transaction by a State-owned enterprise (they do 
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events, we find large and statistically significant differences in the reactions of firms with high 
and low levels of expropriation, even though, as shown in Table 3, the market-wide reaction was 
positive but not significantly different from zero for the related-guarantee and asset-transfer 
events.  Our evidence also shows the regulations were perceived to be ineffective for firms with 
controlling block holders with the closest ties to the government. 
 
5.3.2 Other Governance Proxies and Cross-Sectional Differences in CARs 
In the previous section, we demonstrated significant cross-sectional differences in the 
share price reactions of firms with high and low levels of expropriation as proxied by the total 
value of potentially harmful related-party transactions in the year before the regulations were 
announced.  In this section, we provide additional evidence on cross-sectional differences in the 
share-price reactions of firms classified into low- and high-governance portfolios using seven 
traditional corporate governance proxies, including the cash-flow rights of the largest 
shareholder, the shareholding of non controlling shareholders, the presence of B-shares and the 
type of controlling shareholder.  
The results from estimating our portfolio time-series models appear in Table 6. We 
present the results from the time-series model, eq. (4), based upon three portfolios: long on the 
high-third (half/fifth) and short on the low-third (half/fifth) of firms based upon each 
orthogonalized explanatory variable.  We present the results using both our Long Event 
Windows and our Five-Day Event Windows. Because the results are generally consistent across 
the six alternative specifications (2 windows times three groupings), we focus our discussion 
primarily on the results based upon three groups of firms using the Long Event Window.  
                                                                                                                                                             
not distinguish between market-oriented SOEs and other government block holders) than in 
 33
First, we find weak evidence that suggests CARs tend to be lower for firms where the 
cash-flow rights of the largest shareholder are higher than 30 percent 
(Cash-Flow Rights >30%).31 Firms in the lowest third for this variable outperform the firms in 
the highest third by a statistically significant 2.7 percentage points. Similar results are obtained 
when we split the sample into two groups and when we use the five-day windows, but the CAR 
is insignificant when we split the sample into five groups. We conclude that there is only weak 
evidence that minority shareholders in firms where the largest shareholder has greater ownership 
benefit less from the regulations relative to those where the largest shareholder has less 
ownership.  
Second, we consistently find a negative and significant relationship between the CARs 
and our Non-Controlling Block Holders variable. Firms with larger holdings by the non-
controlling block holders experienced significantly smaller increases in value around the 
announcement of the new regulations than firms with smaller shareholding by non-controlling 
block holders. The total difference in the cumulative abnormal return around the three events 
between the high- and low-tercile portfolios is 5.9%, statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Third, there is no significant relation between MOSOE ownership and the CARs. This 
result is inconsistent with the notion that minority shareholders in market oriented SOEs are 
more likely to benefit because the regulator is more likely to enforce the new regulations when a 
MOSOE is the controlling block holder than when a State Bureaucrat is the controlling block 
holder. The evidence is also inconsistent with our result in Table 4, where we show that the 
group of MOSOEs with high EXPROP outperform the group of MOSOEs with low EXPROP. 
                                                                                                                                                             
reaction to connected transactions by Private Entities. 
31 Note that we can split our sample into thirds based upon a dummy variable because it has been 
orthoganalized against the other eight explanatory variables rendering it semi-continuous. 
 34
However, we do find that firms controlled by Private Entities have larger price increases around 
the introduction of the regulations. This is supportive of the idea that private controlling block 
holders are more likely to expropriate than State owners, as they actually receive cash flows from 
the firm, whereas cash flows of shares ultimately owned by the State accrue to the taxpayer 
rather than to the government bureaucrats who exercise the State’s control rights. The result is 
also consistent with the idea that the regulator is more likely to enforce the regulations in case of 
expropriation by a private block holder. The total difference in the cumulative abnormal return 
around the three events between the highest and lowest tercile portfolios is 4.7% and is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Fourth, the presence of foreign shareholders (B-Shares) has a negative effect on the 
abnormal return for the three announcements. These results are consistent with our hypothesis 
that controlling shareholders of firms with foreign shareholders are less likely to expropriate 
minority shareholders because of the greater transparency and greater sophistication of these 
minority shareholders. The total difference in CARs around the three events between the highest 
and lowest tercile portfolios is 8.6%, statistically significant at better than the 1% level. 
There is no consistent evidence that shareholders in firms where the CEO is Chairman 
benefited from the new regulations. Using the long event windows, the results suggest that 
shareholders in firms without Independent Directors benefit from the new regulations. However, 
when we use five-day event windows, the CARs are insignificant.  Thus, consistent with the 
findings in Table 4, where we found no evidence that these variables are related to a firm’s 
industry-adjusted Q, our results suggest that minority shareholders do not perceive themselves to 
be more at risk of expropriation at firms where the CEO also wears the Chairman’s hat and at 
firms without independent directors. 
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Other results in Table 6 show that the CARs around the announcements are not related to 
leverage. This result is consistent with the idea that creditors in China play a very limited role in 
the governance of firms. The four largest banks in China control the majority of banking assets 
in the country and are directly controlled by the Chinese government. These banks typically 
allocate credit to individual firms on the basis of national policy rather than on financial 
condition or performance, and typically are not involved in active monitoring.32  
The CAR is positively related to firm size, indicating that larger firms benefited relatively 
more from the new regulations than smaller firms. This result is consistent with our finding that 
larger firms are engaged in more related party transactions (scaled by market capitalisation) than 
small firms.  
Overall, our results suggest that firms with higher levels of expropriation (proxied by 
several variables that have been used as indicators of the quality of corporate governance) 
benefited more from the regulations than firms with lower levels of expropriation.    
 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
Recent studies of corporate ownership around the world show that listed firms typically 
have controlling block holders.  For such firms, the primary concern of corporate governance is 
the protection of minority shareholders from expropriation by a controlling block holder and her 
management team.  
In this study, we examine whether securities-market regulations intended to improve 
minority shareholder protection in China—a civil-law transitional economy with poorly 
developed institutions—can be effective. Our results suggest that they can—at least for firms that 
                                                 
32 In a study by the World Bank, the authors observe that “creditors are among the least effective 
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do not have close ties to the government. We find that firms with higher level of expropriation 
from minority shareholders disproportionately benefit from the regulations relative to firms with 
lower levels of expropriation from minority shareholders (whether proxied by a direct measure 
of expropriation based on the total value of related party transactions, or  measures of firm-
specific corporate governance such as the relative power of the largest shareholder, the presence 
of foreign shareholders and other corporate governance related variables).  
We also report evidence that suggests effectiveness of the new regulations is highest for 
firms with private controlling block holders and lowest for firms where the controlling block 
holder has the closest ties with the government. This evidence confirms the importance of 
political connections, as it suggests that Chinese minority shareholders expect the regulator to 
enforce the regulations when a private block holder engages in expropriation but not when State 
controlled entities engage in expropriation.  
  
                                                                                                                                                             
instruments of corporate control in China” (World Bank (2002), p. xvi) 
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Appendix 1:  
Chinese Regulatory Changes Occurring During the First Quarter of 2000 
 
On May 18, 2000, the CRSC released a new regulation regarding the procedures for 
shareholder meetings, while emphasizing that all corporate directors have a fiduciary duty to 
conduct proper shareholder meetings. The new regulation was publicly announced on May 26, 
2000.33 The most important improvements in terms of minority investor protection are: 
 
i) Shareholders who hold, separately or jointly, more than five percent of the 
voting power may propose motions for discussion at the shareholders’ Annual 
General Meeting. 
 
ii) When the meeting votes on associated trading, shareholders involved in the 
associated trading shall not participate in the voting, and their rights to vote 
shall not be counted among the aggregate shares possessing voting rights. 
 
iii) When a motion concerning the election of directors and members of the 
supervisory board is discussed at the shareholders’ meeting, shareholders shall 
vote on the candidate for director or supervisor individually. 
 
iv) When disputes occur concerning the assembling and convening of a meeting, 
voting procedures, or the legitimacy and effectiveness of a resolution, the 
parties concerned can take legal action in a People’s Court in order to resolve 
the dispute. 
 
On June 6, 2000, the CSRC released a new regulation prohibiting listed firms from 
issuing loan guarantees to their shareholders, shareholders’ subsidiaries, and individuals. In 
addition, if the firm should issue a loan guarantee to an unrelated party, it should obtain a mutual 
guarantee to control risk, and the firm’s managers are prohibited from signing a loan guarantee 
contract without approval of the board, or approval at a shareholders’ meeting. This regulation 
was first publicly reported in Chinese newspapers on June 15, 2000. 
 
On June 26, 2000, the CSRC released a new regulation regarding reorganizations of 
listed companies. The regulation, which was published in the newspapers on July 24, 2000, 
stipulates that if gross (net) assets are acquired or sold that account for more than 50% of the 
latest audited gross (net) assets of the listed company, or the profit from acquired or sold assets 
account for more than 50% of the latest audited profit of the listed company, then the listed 
company shall perform the following procedures: 
 
i) The board of directors shall conduct a feasibility study and disclose the 
information as if it was a public offering. 
 
                                                 
33 Before publication in the newspapers, the regulatory changes were first released to a limited 
number of market participants: the securities regulatory offices, the stock exchanges and the 
listed companies. 
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ii) The board shall hire accounting and law firms qualified to conduct securities 
business to certify the relevant issues. 
 
iii) The board shall issue a resolution on the relevant issues and report to the Stock 
Exchange within two days after the resolution is made, and announce to the public 
the resolution with the comments of the intermediaries and the board of 
supervisors. 
 
iv) Upon examination and approval of the shareholders meeting, the listed company 
shall implement the plan of asset purchase or sale. 
 
v) If the counter-party has a tacit understanding with the controlling shareholder of 
the listed company, the transaction shall be deemed an affiliated transaction, 
which shall be subject to the relevant rules and regulations. 
 
vi) After the major purchase or sale of assets, the listed company shall ensure the 
separation of personnel, assets and accounting from its controlling shareholder.  
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Appendix 2: 
Description of Related-Party Transactions 
 
1. Commodity Transaction 
All businesses involving the sale of commodities, including goods, products, materials, raw 
materials, water, electricity, gas and power, purchase of commodities and supply of commodities 
in related party transactions. 
2. Asset Transaction 
All businesses involving the purchase of assets (other intangible and fixed assets except 
commodities), and transfer, use, swap, restructuring and trust of asset in related party 
transactions 
3. Receiving or Rendering of Services 
After shareholding companies are restructured and listed, they generally strip off semi-social 
non-productive assets, but still need affiliated companies to provide related services. Therefore, 
two parties will sign an agreement with regard to expenses payment and sharing with related 
parties before listing. Fund transfer occurring in the activities is an important aspect in China 
listed firms related party transactions. 
4. Agency, commissioning 
A listed firm entrusts its related parties for financing, processing and consigning. It can also be 
the related parties accept the listed firm’s entrustment to carry on business. 
5.  Fund transaction 
Since listed firms are closely connected with their parent companies in business, a certain 
amount of related-parties accounts receivable occur. Listed firms make advances to their parent 
companies via charging capital tied-up fees so that listed firms have their income increased on 
one hand and parent companies obtain needed fund on the other hand. But if the amount is 
excessively large or the term is too long, it will affect listed firms’ operating, investment and 
financial condition. It includes loans or equity fund in the form of cash or in kind. 
6. Guarantee and pledge 
A listed firm and its parent company or each affiliated companies provide mutual guarantee. 
Related guarantee between a listed firm and its main shareholders, especially controlling 
shareholder, can be bi-directional. Either the listed firm provides guarantee for main 
shareholders’ debts or main shareholders provide guarantee for the listed firm. 
7.  Lease 
Because it is not wholly listed, an asset leasing relationship between a listed firm and its parent 
companies is commonly existed, including the lease of intangible assets, such as the right to land 
use and trademark, and the lease of fixed assets, such as facilities and equipment. 
8. Trust Operating (management side) 
Operating right entrust management and business between listed firms and affiliated companies, 
including transact operating right and business trust management and other management related 
aspects. 
9. Donation 
Grant, donation or other business activities between listed firms and affiliated companies 
10. Non-monetary transaction 
Both transaction parties make exchanges with non-monetary assets, including equity for equity 
transactions, but excluding non-monetary transactions involved in company mergers. The 
transactions do not involve monetary assets or only involve a small number of monetary assets. 
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11. Equity transaction 
All equity related transaction involved with stock transfer, stock entrust, distribution of dividend 
occurring between a listed firm and affiliated companies 
12. Debt transaction 
Debt transfer, debt repayment, debt restructuring and all other transactions relating to debts, 
occurring between a listed firm and related companies  
13. Cooperative project 
A related party transaction in the form of cooperative investment means that a listed firm and its 
related companies make a joint investment in a specific project and distribute the income by the 
proportion agreed upon in advance. 
14. License agreement 
Transactions involving the licensing of intellectual property and intangible assets, occurring 
between a listed firm and its related companies 
15. R&D achievements 
Transactions where a party of a listed firm and its affiliated company transfers its unfinished 
research product or project and developed product or project to the other party 
16. Key managers’ remuneration 
Transactions where a listed firm accepts the remuneration paid by its affiliated company to its 
managers or a related company accepts the remuneration paid by the listed firm to its managers 
17. Other events 
Related party transactions which do not fall into the above categories or unclassified related 
party transactions. 
 
(Source: GTA/CSMAR Manual on Related-Party Transactions) 
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Table 1:  
Related Party Transactions of Chinese listed firms in 1999 
Panel A presents frequency and average value of the different types of related party transactions 
for 887 Chinese listed firms in 1999. (Source: the GTA/CSMAR Related-Party Transactions 
Database). Transactions are classified as potentially beneficial for the listed company if the listed 
firm received cash, loans or guarantees from the related party, all other related party transactions 
are classified as harmful (see Cheung et al. 2007). A detailed description of each type of related-
party transaction is provided in Appendix 2.  
Panel B reports descriptive statistics for the variable EXPROP i, which is the sum of the value of 
potentially harmful related party transactions in 1999, scaled by the market value of firm i as of 
year-end 1999. State Bureaucrat is a dummy variable equal to one if the largest block holder 
classified as a State Bureaucrat; MOSOE is a dummy variable equal to one if the largest block 
holder is a market-oriented State-owned enterprise; Private Entity is a dummy variable equal to 
one if the largest block holder is a private entity. Classifications are based upon 17 detailed 
categories of ultimate ownership established researchers at the National University of Singapore 
as described in Delios et al. (2006). The t-statistic in the last column of Panel B tests if 
ΔEXPROP is different from zero. The p-values in the last two rows are based on test of equality 
of means (medians) across the three types of ownership of the largest shareholder. 
 
Transaction Observations Mean Value (in million RMB)
Beneficial 495 80.34
Harmful 5,618 52.75
Detailed Classification of Harmful Related Party Transactions
Observations Mean value  % of total
Commodity 2,644 79.89 71.5
Asset 540 29.06 5.3
Services 583 23.60 4.7
Commission 165 47.72 2.7
Fund Transfer 420 27.24 3.9
Guarantee 360 43.36 5.3
Lease 402 16.08 2.2
Operating trust 33 9.22 0.1
Non-Monetary Transaction 2 0.00 0.0
Stock Transaction 203 43.74 3.0
Debt Transaction 34 42.88 0.5
Cooperative Project 67 36.92 0.8
R&D 34 0.73 0.0
Manager Remuneration 22 9.60 0.1
License 81 0.44 0.0
Other Events 28 32.01 0.3
Panel A: Related Party Transactions for Chinese firms in 1999
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EXPROP 1999 EXPROP 2001 ΔEXPROP  t-stat
All Mean 0.065 0.331 0.266 1.1
Median 0.019 0.019 0.001
State Bureacrats Mean 0.046 0.075 0.029 2.2
Mean rank 1.580 1.788 0.208 2.3
MOSOEs Mean 0.075 0.468 0.392 1.0
Mean rank 2.227 2.185 -0.041 -0.8
Private Entities Mean 0.046 0.068 0.023 1.5
Mean rank 1.884 1.766 -0.116 -0.6
Equality of means: p-value 0.100 0.750 0.780
Equality of ranks: p-value 0.001 0.001 0.040
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics EXPROP 
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Table 2: 
Sample Descriptive Statistics by Expropriation Terciles 
 
The sample consists of 887 publicly traded Chinese firms, segmented into three terciles based 
upon the sum of the value of potentially harmful related party transactions in 1999, scaled by the 
market value of the firm as per December 1999. Industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q is measured at the 
end of year 1999. Tobin’s Q is the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt 
divided by the book value of total assets. We control for differences in Q across industries by 
calculating the median Q for each industry and then by subtracting the appropriate industry 
median from each firm’s Q. Total Assets is expressed in million RMB.  Leverage is the book 
value of debt divided by the book value of total assets at the end of year 1999.  State Bureaucrat 
is a dummy variable equal to one if the largest block holder classified as a State Bureaucrat; 
MOSOE is a dummy variable equal to one if the largest block holder is a market-oriented State-
owned enterprise; Private Entity is a dummy variable equal to one if the largest block holder is a 
private entity. Classifications are based upon 17 detailed categories of ultimate ownership 
established researchers at the National University of Singapore (“NUS”) as described in Delios 
et al. (2006).  CF > 30 assumes a value of 1 if the largest shareholder owns more than 30 percent 
of all outstanding shares (and 0 otherwise). Non-Controlling Block Holders is the sum of the 
shareholdings of the second through tenth largest shareholders. B-Shares is equal to one for firms 
that have both A- and B-shares outstanding and equal to zero for all other firms. CEO is Chair is 
a dummy variable that equals one when the Chief Executive Officer is also the Chairman of the 
Board, and Independent Directors is a dummy variable that is equal to one when the firm has at 
least one independent director.  For each variable in column 1, the last two columns report the 
difference in the means of firms in terciles one and three, followed by the corresponding p-value.  
All Low Medium High Low - High p-value
Industry Adjusted Tobin's Q 0.519 1.036 0.773 -0.249 1.285 0.001
Total Assets 146,473   103,692  122,353   213,230  109,538-    0.001
Leverage 0.428 0.432 0.420 0.432 0.000 0.986
State Bureaucrat 0.239 0.333 0.241 0.141 0.192 0.001
MOSOE 0.656 0.546 0.669 0.753 -0.208 0.001
Private Entity 0.096 0.112 0.084 0.091 0.021 0.407
CF > 30 0.733 0.631 0.757 0.811 -0.180 0.001
Non-Controlling Block Holders 0.168 0.191 0.184 0.128 0.063 0.001
B-Shares 0.079 0.061 0.088 0.088 -0.027 0.215
CEO is Chair 0.117 0.149 0.111 0.091 0.058 0.030
Independent Directors 0.023 0.024 0.007 0.037 -0.013 0.343
Expropriation
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Table 3: 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns around Regulatory Events 
This table reports the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around announcements of three new 
regulations intended to improve corporate governance at Chinese publicly listed firms. The first 
new regulation substantially increased the rights of minority shareholders at a firm’s Annual 
Shareholders’ Meeting; the second prohibited the issuance of loan guarantees by a firm to its 
controlling shareholder; and the third improved the transparency and regulation of asset transfers 
to related parties. We estimate CARs using an equally weighted portfolio consisting of all 887 
sample firms. The results in column two (four) and three (five) are based on eq. (1) and eq. (2), 
respectively: 
 
Market Return t =  β0 + Σ β j  Event J + ε t      (1) 
Market Return t =  β0 + Σ β j  Event J +β5  HK Returnt + ε t   (2) 
 
where Market Return t is the return on an equally weighted market portfolio during day t; Event 
J, J = 1 to 3 are dummy variables that equal 1/n for the dates within the event window of length n 
for the first, second and third regulation and equal zero otherwise; Hong-Kong Return t is the 
return for day t on an equally weighted portfolio of 24 Chinese firms listed on the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange; and β j , J = 1 to 3 are the estimated cumulative adjusted returns associated with 
each event window. The model is estimated over 250 trading days ending July 25, 2000 (one day 
after the newspapers published the third regulation). The Long Event Windows for Events 1, 2 
and 3 are 11, 10 and 23 trading days, respectively, and span the period from the initial 
announcement of the regulation by the CSRC to the first publication by the financial press. The 
Five-Day Event Windows span the five days centered on the CSRC announcement and the five 
days centered on the first publication by the financial press. 
t-statistics are in parentheses. 
a, b, and c indicate statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. 
 Long Event Windows Five-Day Event Windows 
Variable Model (1) Model (2) Model (1) Model (2)
Intercept  
 
0.002
(1.6)
0.001
(1.4)
0.002 
(1.5) 
0.001
(1.4)
Event 1: 
Shareholder Meeting 
 
0.101 b
(2.1)
0.117 b
(2.3)
0.099 b 
(2.1) 
0.107 b
(2.3)
Event 2: 
Related Guarantees 
 
0.011
(0.2)
 0.001
(0.0)
0.011 
(0.2) 
-0.001
-(0.0)
Event 3: 
Asset Transfer 
 
0.019
(0.3)
0.006
(0.1)
0.023 
(0.5) 
0.011
(0.3)
  
Hong-Kong  
Return 
 
 0.086 b
(2.0)
 0.079c
(1.9)
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Table 4: 
Cross-Sectional Regression Models to Explain EXPROP and Tobin’s Q 
 
Panel A reports the results of a cross-sectional regression with EXPROP as dependent variable. 
EXPROP is defined as the sum of the value of potentially harmful related-party transactions in 
1999, scaled by the market value of the firm as of December 1999.  
 
Panel B reports the results of a cross-sectional regression with industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q as 
dependent variable. Industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q is measured at the end of year 1999. Tobin’s Q 
is measured as the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt divided by the 
book value of total assets. We control for differences in Q across industries by calculating the 
median Q for each industry and then by subtracting the appropriate industry median from each 
firm’s Q. All independent variables are defined in Table 2. There are 887 observations. 
a, b, and c indicate statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Panel B:
Intercept -2.978 a 12.846 a
-8.8 13.1
Total Assets 0.286 a -1.062 a
10.1 -12.8
Leverage 0.062 -1.944 a
0.5 -6.1
MOSOE 0.299 a 0.480 c
2.9 1.7
Private Entity 0.365 a 0.796 b
2.9 2.3
Cash-Flow Rights > 30 * State Bureaucrat 0.144 0.793 a
1.4 2.8
Cash-Flow Rights > 30 * MOSOE -0.001 0.035
0.0 0.2
Cash-Flow Rights > 30 * Private Entity -0.060 -0.213
-0.4 -0.6
Non-Controlling Block Holder * State Bureaucrat -0.007 b 0.014
-2.4 1.6
Non-Controlling Block Holder * MOSOE -0.004 0.021 a
-1.5 3.0
Non-Controlling Block Holder * Private Entity -0.009 a 0.025 a
-3.2 3.3
B-Shares -0.183 b 0.062
-2.2 0.3
CEO is Chair -0.088 -0.173
-1.3 -0.9
Independent Directors 0.263 c -0.125
1.8 -0.3
EXPROP n/a -0.269 a
-2.9
Industry-adjusted QEXPROP
 51
Table 5: 
Difference in Cumulative Abnormal Returns by Degree of Expropriation 
 
This table reports on the relation between EXPROP and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). 
Each cell in Panels A and B1-B3 presents the difference in the CARs of the high- and low-
EXPROP groups around each of the three announcements of new regulations. Panel C reports the 
cumulative abnormal returns for the hedge portfolio cumulated across all three events when the 
full sample is split into two, three and five groups based on the value of EXPROP. 
The first new regulation substantially increased the rights of minority shareholders at a firm’s 
Annual Shareholders’ Meeting; the second prohibited the issuance of loan guarantees by a firm 
to its controlling shareholder; and the third improved the transparency and regulation of asset 
transfers to related parties.  EXPROP is defined as the sum of the value of potentially harmful 
related-party transactions in 1999, scaled by the market value of the firm as of December 1999.  
We estimate the following model: 
 
R (High-EXPROP t ) – R (Low-EXPROP t ) = β0 + Σ β J  Event J + β 5  Market Return t + ε t                     (9) 
 
where:  R (High-EXPROP t) is the return for day t on an equally weighted portfolio of the highest 
third of firms based upon EXPROP; 
R (Low-EXPROP t) is the return for day t on an equally weighted portfolio of the lowest 
third of firms based upon EXPROP; 
β J, J = 1 to 3, are the estimated differences in the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of 
the high-EXPROP and low-EXPROP portfolios during each event window J;  
 
The model is estimated over 250 trading days ending July 25, 2000 (one day after the 
newspapers published the third regulation). Panel A presents results from estimating the relation 
between EXPROP and CARs for the full sample while Panel B1-B3 presents the results for three 
mutually exclusive sub-samples containing only firms controlled by State Bureaucrats, MOSOEs 
or Private Entities.  These results are based upon splitting each sample into three groups on the 
basis of EXPROP. The Long Event Windows for Events 1, 2 and 3 are 11, 10 and 23 trading 
days, respectively, and span the period from the initial announcement of the regulation by the 
CSRC to the first publication by the financial press. The Five-Day Event Windows span the five 
days centered on the CSRC announcement and the five days centered on the first publication by 
the financial press.  t-statistics are in parentheses. 
a, b, and c indicate statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. 
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(1)
Events
Panel A: All Firms
Long Event Windows 0.035 a 0.018 c 0.052 a 0.101 a
(2.9) (1.7) (3.0) (4.1)
Five-Day Event Windows 0.026 b 0.016 0.024 b 0.065 a
(2.2) (1.5) (2.1) (3.2)
Panel B1: State Bureaucrats
Long Event Windows 0.003 0.010 0.003 0.015
(0.2) (0.7) (0.2) (0.6)
Five-Day Event Windows 0.009 0.009 -0.016 0.002
(0.8) (0.8) (-1.3) (0.1)
Panel B2: MOSOEs
Long Event Windows 0.039 b 0.023 0.052 b 0.110 a
(2.4) (1.5) (2.3) (3.3)
Five-Day Event Windows 0.027 c 0.021 0.030 b 0.078 a
(1.8) (1.4) (2.0) (2.9)
Panel B3: Private Entities
Long Event Windows 0.065 b 0.048 b 0.074 b 0.182 a
(2.5) (2.0) (2.0) (3.4)
Five-Day Event Windows 0.041 c 0.045 c 0.037 0.123 a
(1.7) (1.9) (1.5) (2.8)
Meeting Guarantees Transfers
Shareholder Related Asset All Three
(2) (3) (4) (5)
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Panel C: Total CARs for different groups
All firms
Long Event Windows 0.074 a 0.101 a 0.117 a
(4.1) (4.1) (3.6)
Five-Day Event Windows 0.047 b 0.065 a 0.066 b
(3.1) (3.2) (2.5)
State Bureaucrats
Long Event Windows 0.032 0.015 0.021
(1.4) (0.6) (0.7)
Five-Day Event Windows 0.018 0.002 -0.016
(0.9) (0.1) (0.0)
MOSOEs -0.1
Long Event Windows 0.09 a 0.110 a 0.151 a
(3.9) (3.3) (3.2)
Five-Day Event Windows 0.058 c 0.078 a 0.092 b
(3.0) (2.9) (2.4)
Private Entities
Long Event Windows 0.104 b 0.182 a 0.203 a
(2.2) (3.4) 3.2
Five-Day Event Windows 0.069 c 0.123 a 0.137 a
1.9 (2.8) 2.6
(1) (2) (3)
2 Groups 3 Groups 5 Groups
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Table 6: 
Corporate Governance and Differences in Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
 
This table presents the results from estimating the relation between a set of governance-related 
variables and the cumulative abnormal returns around announcements of three new regulations 
intended to improve corporate governance at Chinese listed firms. The first new regulation 
substantially increased the rights of minority shareholders at a firm’s Annual Shareholders’ 
Meeting; the second prohibited the issuance of loan guarantees by a firm to its controlling 
shareholder; and the third improved the transparency and regulation of asset transfers to related 
parties.  We use a portfolio time-series regression model to regress an event-window dummy on 
the returns from a portfolio that is long on the highest and short on the lowest third (half, fifth) of 
firms based upon orthogonalized explanatory variable OV: (Cash-Flow Rights > 30%, Non-
Controlling Block Holders, B-Shares, MOSOE, Private Entity, CEO is Chair, Independent 
Director, Firm Size or Leverage; which are defined in Table 2).  
The model is as follows:  
 
          R (High-OV t )  – R (Low-OV t) = β 0 +  β 1  Events  + β 2  Market Return t + ε t              (8) 
 
where: Events is a dummy variable that equals 1 / 44 for the dates within the three event window 
(or 1 / 30 for dates within the 5-day event windows), and zero otherwise; R (High-OV t) is the 
return on the High-OV portfolio;  R (Low-OV t) is the return on the Low-OV portfolio; Market 
Return t is the market return on day t; and ε t is an i.i.d. error term.  
 
Each cell gives the difference in the CARs of the High-OV and Low-OV Portfolios during the 
event window around the three regulatory changes. The models are estimated over 250 trading 
days ending July 25, 2000 (one day after the newspapers published the third regulation). The 
Long Event Windows for Events 1, 2 and 3 are 11, 10 and 23 trading days, respectively, and span 
the period from the initial announcement of the regulation by the CSRC to the first publication 
by the financial press. The Five-Day Event Windows span the five days centered on the CSRC 
announcement and the five days centered on the first publication by the financial press. 
t-statistics appear in parentheses.  
a, b, and c indicate statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. 
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Long Window 5-day-window
2 Groups 3 Groups 5 groups 2 Groups 3 Groups 5 groups
Cash-Flow Rights > 30% -0.046 a -0.027 c 0.003 -0.029 b -0.024 b -0.012
-(3.1) -(1.8) (0.2) -(2.4) -(2.0) -(0.8)
Non-Controlling Block holders -0.057 a -0.059 a -0.052 b -0.035 b -0.034 b -0.029
-(3.2) -(2.8) -(2.2) -(2.4) -(2.0) -(1.5)
MOSOE 0.011 0.011 -0.014 -0.002 0.001 -0.006
(0.9) (0.7) -(0.8) -(0.2) (0.1) -(0.4)
Private Entity 0.047 a 0.047 a 0.05 a 0.023 b 0.032 b 0.028 c
(3.2) (3.2) (2.6) (1.9) (2.2) (1.8)
B-shares -0.069 a -0.086 a -0.101 a -0.037 b -0.04 b -0.043 c
-(3.5) -(3.5) -(3.3) -(2.2) -(2.1) -(1.7)
CEO is Chair 0.032 a 0.030 c -0.001 -0.015 0.014 -0.001
(2.6) (1.7) -(0.0) -(1.5) (1.0) -(0.0)
Independent Directors -0.043 b -0.055 b -0.054 b -0.013 -0.022 -0.021
-(2.6) -(2.5) -(2.5) -(1.0) -(1.2) -(1.1)
Leverage -0.023 -0.028 -0.033 -0.008 -0.011 -0.016
-(1.4) -(1.3) -(1.2) -(0.6) -(0.6) -(0.7)
Total Assets 0.093 a 0.129 a 0.15 a 0.052 a 0.068 a 0.083 a
(4.2) (4.3) (4.4) (2.9) (2.7) (2.9)
 
 
